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STATE STREET TRUST DOCTRINE
be divulged will curtail freedom of consultation with legal advisers.4" The
Garner decision should have limited impact, since the privilege would be
denied only when a corporation is involved in a suit with its shareholders
and the shareholders can show "good cause" why it should not be ex-
tended. Since the need for counsel is still eminent, full disclosure by
honest management should not be affected.
MICHAEL D. MEEKER
Federal Estate Taxation-The State Street Trust Doctrine,
1959-1970: R.I.P.
In March, 1970, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit buried one
of the most vexatious concepts in the field of estate taxation. The court,
in Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States,- specifically overruled State
Street Trust Co. v. United States' by holding that "no aggregation of
purely administrative powers"8 would cause the corpus of a trust to be
included in the settlor's estate under sections 2036 (a) (2) and 2038 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.4 In State Street the court held that
when a decedent-settlor had retained as trustee broad powers of admin-
istration which permitted him to exchange trust property without reference
to value, to invest in securities yielding either high income or no income
at all (specifically including wasting investments) and to allocate assets
to income or principal in all cases (whether state law as to proper alloca-
" See Comment, The Lawyer-Client Privilege: Its Application to Corporations,
The Role of Ethics, and Its Possible Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 235, 256-59(1961).
1423 F.2d 601 (1st Cir. 1970).
263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
3 423 F.2d at 603.
'N T. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 2036(a) (2), 2038. Section 2036 of the Code in-
cludes in a decedent's estate property transferred to another in which the decedent
retained a life estate. Specifically included is property with respect to which the
decedent retained "the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to
designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income there-
from." This section is only applicable to transfers made after March 3, 1931.
Section 2036 includes the total amount of the property transferred. Section 2038
includes within a decedent's estate transferred property subject to the power of the
decedent to "alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, or where any such power is
relinquished in contemplation of decedent's death." It makes no difference under
section 2038 whether the decedent ever owned the property subject to the power;
it is only necessary that the decedent had the power on the date of his death or
had transferred it in contemplation of his death. Both sections 2 036(a) (2) and
2038 include property even if the power is exercisable only in a fiduciary capacity.
Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2036-1(b) (3), 20.2038(a) (1958).
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tion was in doubt or not), then the settlor-trustee had retained the right
to "designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the
income therefrom" under section 2036(a) (2) and the power "to alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate" under section 2038.'
The State Street trust was administered under the laws of Massachu-
setts subject to the supervision of the state courts of equity. The first
circuit felt that although these state courts would intervene should the
trustee act in utter disregard of a beneficiary by putting "all, or nearly
all, of the trust assets in wasting investments [or] in a property yielding
little or even no income,"' nonetheless, a trustee who possessed broad
management powers could substantially shift the benefits of such a trust
between the life tenants and remaindermen.7 The decision was grounded
in the idea that the state courts had no ascertainable standard by which
to enforce the rights of beneficiaries with adverse interests.' The effect of
this holding was to throw considerable doubt on the tax consequences of
irrevocable inter vivos trusts incorporating wide administrative powers.9
Sound drafting practices until State Street had called for broad dis-
cretionary powers in the trustees to prevent the trust from being crippled
by delay and expense of frequent court approval.'0 It was not surprising
therefore that, at the next opportunity, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court launched an attack on the decision and began to demonstrate the de-
gree of supervision that the state courts would impose over fiduciaries. The
newly militant posture was evident in Boston Safe Deposit & Triest Co.
v. Stone,"1 which involved the power of the trustees to determine reason-
ably the value of assets for distribution. 2 The supreme court, in finding
that the trustees had valued the assets reasonably, pointed out that " 'a
court of equity may control a trustee in the exercise of a fiduciary dis-
cretion if it acts beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment or unreason-
ably disregards usual fiduciary principles, or the purposes of the trust, or
5263 F.2d at 637-39. Both sections 2036 and 2038 are applicable regardless of
whether the settlor-trustee holds the power alone or with another as long as the
cotrustees do not have substantial adverse interests. It is necessary that the settlor
hold the power in a fiducial capacity either as trustee or by implication from the
trust instrument.
6 Id. at 638-39.
7 Id.8Id. at 639.
'See Barrett, The Marital Deduction, 50 MAss. L.Q. 18 (1965).
" See geerally Note, 45 IOWA L. REv. 426 (1960).
1 348 Mass. 345, 203 N.E.2d 547 (1965).
"
2The facts found by the lower court indicate that this was a clear case of
reasonable and impartial determination of value.
[Vol. 49
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if it fails to observe standards of judgment apparent from the applicable
instrument.' "13 The court pointedly asserted that it disagreed with the
suggestion to the contrary by the majority in State Street.14
The Massachusetts court made an even more telling attack in Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Silliman.Y The trust in this case was set up to benefit
an intervening life estate with a charitable remainderman and included the
power of the trustee to decide whether to treat accretions and expenses as
income or principal. The court held that the power to allocate accretions
as disbursements between income and principal would defeat the intent
of the trust if the trustee could substitute his uncontrolled discretion for
the established rules and, as in Boston Safe, Massachusetts courts would
hold a fiduciary to "reasonable regard of usual fiduciary principles"
when applying discretionary powers. 6 "Reasonable regard" was inter-
preted to mean that established rules would be applied. 17 Boston Safe and
Silliman both cited with specific approval Judge McGruder's dissent in
State Street and substantially clarified the degree of supervision that
Massachusetts courts would exercise over fiduciaries.'"
The United States Tax Court, which at the time of State Street was
not obligated to consider the holdings of other federal courts,'" supported
the position of the Massachusetts court in two significant decisions.
1" 348 Mass. at 351, 203 N.E.2d at 552.
" As Chief Judge Magruder indicated ... in his dissent [in State Street]
.... a Massachusetts Court of Equity will 'supervise the administration of
. . trusts so as to control any attempt to shift the incidence of their en-
joyment.' Even broadly expressed administrative and management powers
. . . 'are limited by standards which the Massachusetts court of equity could
and would apply to supervise effectively... [proper trust] administration.'
We disagree with any suggestion to the contrary... in the majority opinion
in that case ....
Id. at 351 n.8, 203 N.E.2d at 552 n.8.
" 352 Mass. 6, 223 N.E.2d 504 (1967).
1 Id. at 10, 223 N.E.2d at 507.
3.7 Id.
18 See also Briggs v. Crowley, 352 Mass. 194, 224 N.E.2d 417 (1967) (trust
provisions purporting to relieve trustees from duty of accounting except to donor
ineffective as against public policy to deprive beneficiary standing to compel
accounting); Holyoke Nat'l Bank v. Wilson, 350 Mass. 223, 214 N.E.2d 42 (1966)
(trustees are required to exercise power to invade corpus for beneficiary's com-
fort, maintenance, and support with proper regard to accepted fiduciary principles);
Copp v. Worcester Co. Nat'l Bank, 347 Mass. 548, 199 N.E.2d 200 (1964) (dis-
cretionary power of the trustee to invade corpus of trust to the extent of five hun-
dred dollars for the proper maintenance of the settlor's wife had to be exercised
in accordance with fiduciary standards).
'
0 The Tax Reform Act of 1969*changed the United. States Tax Court from an
administrative agency to a court deriving its powers from article I of the Con-
stitution. Tax Reform Act of 1969, 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (Supp. V, 1965-69).
19711
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Estate of Edward E. Ford0 involved in inter vivos trust administered
under the laws of New York. The settlor had named himself sole trustee
and had retained the power to invade the corpus "for the purpose of de-
fraying expenses occasioned by illness, infirmity or disability, either mental
or physical, or for his support, maintenance, education, welfare and
happiness."'" He also had retained the administrative powers to allocate
receipts, losses, and expenses to either income or principal and to invest
in such classes of property as the trustee might in his discretion select. The
classes of property specifically included investments not normally con-
sidered appropriate for trusts.22 The court held as to the invasion power,
that although "happiness" does not normally provide an ascertainable
standard, in this case the power was circumscribed by the requirement
that the beneficiary be in "need" of funds. This requirement so limited
the definition of "happiness" that a New York court of equity would be
able to find the requisite external standard to enforce the beneficiaries'
rights.23 The court rationalized the administrative powers as being "com-
monly included in trust instruments," noting that abuse of discretion
"would be subject to equity court of review. ' 24 Further, the majority spe-
cifically found that since each of these powers was subject to supervision
by the equity court, the State Street rule that the powers, when viewed in
the aggregate, would require inclusion under sections 2036 and 2038, did
not apply.'
Ford was decided by a split court with five judges dissenting, but in
the following year a united court decided the case of Estate of Phyllis W.
McGillicuddy" on similar grounds. This case involved the validity of a
charitable deduction from the taxable estate. The Commissioner's posi-
tion was that the trustee's powers were so broad that he could shift the
beneficial interests between the income beneficiary and the charitable
remainderman, thus rendering the value of the remainder interest un-
ascertainable.2 The powers involved were the trustee's right to invest in
regulated securities companies and to determine all questions of income or
principal. The latter power was not restricted to those areas of the law
20 53 T.C. 114 (1969).
21 Id. at 121.
22 Id. at 128.
23 Id. at 126-27.
2 Id. at 127-28.
'11Id. at 127-29.
2- 54 T.C. 315 (1970). This trust was also administered under the lavs of
Massachusetts.
2 Id. at 320-21.
[Vol. 49
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in doubt.28 The court simply relied on the statement of Massachusetts
law contained in Sillinwe that the power to allocate accretions and ex-
penses between income and principal was primarily a management power
allowing the trustee to use good faith in instances of doubt and that the
granting of such power would not authorize the favoring of either the life
beneficiary or the remainderman. 30
The principal case, Old Colony Trust Co. v. United States,3 involved
an inter vivos trust administered under the laws of Massachusetts for the
benefit of the son of the settlor-trustee. The settlor had retained the power
to decrease payments of income to the beneficiary when "the stoppage of
such payments is for his [the beneficiary's] best interests."32 The trustee
also had broad administrative powers including the power to make in-
vestments not normally considered safe for trustees, and to "determine,
what was to be charged or credited to income or principal."'3 Here again
the government sought to include the entire corpus of the trust in the
decedent's taxable estate on the basis that both the power of distribution
and of management gave the settlor-trustee the right to designate who
should enjoy the property under section 2036(a) (2). 4 Turning first to
the management powers, the first circuit made short work of -the govern-
ment's argument. Citing the chain of cases discussed above, the court
came to the conclusion that State Street was wrong in concluding that
even though each individual power would be subject to control by a
Massachusetts probate court, the aggregate of the powers gave the trustees
such control over the corpus as to be equated with substantial owner-
ship.3 5 The mere existence of purely administrative powers was deemed
insufficient in itself to work an inclusion under either section 2036 (a) (2)
or 2038 (a) (1) for trusts administered in Massachusetts.
The inquiry into the power over distribution centered on a search for
an ascertainable standard in the body of the trust instrument. 6 Words
authorizing distribution as needed to maintain the beneficiary's way of
life would have provided such a standard.3 7 However, the authorization
28 Id. at 318-19.
" See p. 813 supra.80 54 T.C. at 323.
01423 F.2d 601 (1970).
2 Id. at 602.
38 Id.8
' Id.
1 Id. at 603.86 Id. at 603-04.
87 Id. at 604.
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to withhold payments when in the "best interests" of the settlor's son was
clearly an unascertainable standard; this result was reinforced by the
parent-child relationship between the trustee and beneficiary.88 Although
the absence of "best'interests" criteria resulted in the taxpayer losing his
case, he did nonetheless establish an important change in existing tax law.
The undeniable effect of Old Colony is to prevent the corpus of a trust
from being included in a decedent-trustee's estate under sections 2036(a)
(2) aid 2038(1) (b) solely because of broad discretionary administrative
powers. But since the decision was based on the degree of supervision over
fiduciaries by Massachusetts courts, the government's position is not
entirely vitiated as to other jurisdictions. It is appropriate therefore to
consider the probable result of such an argument in light of the super-
vision provided by North Carolina courts.
Unfortunately, it is not clear that North Carolina courts of equity will
exercise their jurisdiction to control the discretionary powers of trustees
under circumstances that would prevent a State Street inclusion. When
the powers are restricted by a court, the two most commonly employed
means are by finding an abuse of discretion 9 and by finding protection for
remaindermen and/or beneficiaries in interpretation of the settlor's in-
tent The scope of control exercised by courts with respect to abuse of
discretion depends upon judicial definition of terms such as "improper
motive" and "reasonable judgment." Interpretation of intent often does
not give such leeway, however, since in many cases the plain wording of
te instrument makes clear the settlor's intent to provide unbridled dis-
cretion in the trustee in administration of the trust.41 In any event, the
Id. The parent-child relationship between the trustee-settlor and the bene-
ficiary makes the "best interests" requirement even more vague since each parent
has his own opinion as to what is in the best interest of a child.
" The courts find abuse of discretion of the trustee "if he acts dishonestly, or if
be acts with improper even though not dishonest motive, or if he fails to use his
judgment, or if he acts beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment." Woodward
v. Mordecai, 234 N.C. 463, 471, 67 S.E.2d 639, 644 (1951); RESTATEMENT OF
TRUSTS § 187 (1935) ; 65 C.J. Trusts § 539 (1933).
"' Little v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 252 N.C. 229, 113 S.E.2d 689 (1960);
Carter v. Kempton, 233 N.C. 1, 62 S.E.2d 713 (1950); Hester v. Hester, 16 N.C.
328 (1829).
"See, e.g., State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir.
1959). In order to find an intent that is contrary to the plain words of the instru-
ment, the court would have to find ambiguity in the mere existence of classes of
beneficiaries with adverse interests. It is entirely possible for the court to conclude
that the scope actually intended by the settlor was uncontrolled discretion and then
the question is clearly put as to where the external standard of control is that will
provide guidance to both trustee and the courts.
[Vol. 49
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key is an external standard of control that will prevent the corpus from
being included in the decedent-settlor's taxable estate.
The North Carolina Supreme Court in Lichtenfels V. North Carolina
National Bank42 determined that where the trustee had broad investment
powers, including specifically the power not to diversify, the court would
not surcharge the trustee for failure to diversify. The court stated that
"the directives of a Will are honored and given effect unless some over-
riding and compelling reason requires deviation."4 The court on several
occasions has expressed a willingness to intervene in the management of
a trust but these have been, by and large, cases of gross abuse of dis-
cretion amounting to bad faith or fraud.-4 There are no cases dealing
squarely with court supervision of powers as broad as those granted in"
State Street or as would be available if the trust incorporated the statutory
powers of the North Carolina Powers of Fiduciaries Act.45 In short there'
does not appear to be a judicially enforced external standard other than
one for gross abuse of discretion.
Nonetheless, the supreme court on occasion has expressed an attitude
towards discretionary powers that is strongly reminiscent of the language
used by the Massachusetts Court in Silliman.46 An excellent example,
Campbell v. Jordan,47 dealt with the discretionary power to distribute trust
principal. This case held that where the trustee has the power to distribute
to lifetime beneficiaries limited by the requirement that the distribution be
"necessary and best" for the beneficiary and consistent with th, welfare of
the trust estate and the testator's family, the trustee could not distribute un-
42268 N.C. 467, 151 S.E.2d 78 (1966).
Id. at 479, 151 S.E.2d at 85.
"Kuykendall v. Proctor, 270 N.C. 510, 155 S.E.2d 293 (1967) (trustee was the
guardian of the incompetent life beneficiary and was also the remainderman under
the terms of the trust); Erickson v. Starling, 233 N.C. 539, 64 S.E.2d 832 (1951)(self-dealing for profit on part of trustee) ; Lightner v. Boone, 222 N.C. 205, 22
S.E.2d 426 (1942) (trustee accused of using trust funds to speculate in his own
xiame).
N.C. GExr. STAT. §§ 32-25 to -27 (1966 & Supp. 1969). This statute includes
a variety of specific powers but the following are those commonly considered to
have adverse estate tax consequences: the power to sell and exchange property
[§ 32-27 (2)], to invest [§ 32-27(3)], and to allocate receipts and expenses between
income and principal [§ 32-27(29)1. For these adverse consequences to occur the
trust must, of course, be inter vivos with the settlor retaining the condemned powers
to himself personally or as a fiduciary. If there is a possibility that the settlor may
become a trustee, the powers may also result in adverse consequences. Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2036-1 (b) (3).
"See p. 813 supra.
'"274 N.C. 233, 162 S.E.2d 545 (1968).
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less the beneficiary could show that these conditions were met.48 After
holding the trustee's powers so limited on these facts, the opinion cited a
Maine case49 defining discretion "as deliberate judgment,-the discernment
of what is right and proper. It implies soundness of judgment-judgment
directed by circumspection." The court in Campbell then quoted the Re-
statement of the Law of Trusts for the proposition that where a trust is
created for sucessive beneficiaries, the trustees must act with due regard
for their interests.50 Kemp v. Paterson,51 a New York case which restricted
the power of the trustee to invade the corpus for the best interests of the
beneficiary, also found favor with the North Carolina court. The Kemp
decision held that best interest of the beneficiary meant " 'best interests'
... within the framework of the status bestowed upon her by the settlor,
the status of a life beneficiary, not of a recipient of the entire trust res."5 2
Such language, if applied to broad administrative powers, would probably
be sufficient to remove them from tax liability even under State Street.
This position is anything but certain, however, since the language in
Campbell is only dicta.
The first circuit in State Street, whether by design or not, was recog-
nizing that a trustee with broad management powers is in fact able to shift
the benefits of a trust between life beneficiaries and remaindermen. These
shifts can be significant to parties with adverse interests even if not for
tax purposes. Yet the trend today continues toward broad trustee discre-
tion in the interest of sound estate management 3 despite the possibility,
or even probability, of a corresponding loss of fiduciary responsibility and
loyalty. 4 The holding in Old Colony presents an opportunity to the North
Id. at 241; 162 S.E.2d at 551.
"In re Murray, 142 Me. 24, 30, 45 A.2d 636, 638 (1946). The power involved
in this case was the power to invade for the comfortable support and maintenance
of the life beneficiary. The court held that the trustee's discretion was not
absolute and that he must act with due regard to the interests of successive
beneficiaries.10 274 N.C. at 242, 162 S.E.2d at 551.
"14 App. Div. 2d 153, 163 N.Y.S.2d 245, aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 40, 159 N.E.2d 661,
188 N.Y.S2d 161 (1959).2 Id. at -, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 248. "Best interests" in this case amounted to
terminating the trust to avoid a fifty-six per cent British estate tax. It was clear
that the trustees were acting honestly and in good faith. The remaindermen were
the children of the life beneficiary. This case represents protection with a ven-
geance of remainder interests from trustee discretion. As a practical matter, the
infant remaindermen would have benefited by the termination of the trust.
" Fratcher, Trustees' Powers Legislation, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 627 (1962);
Horowitz, Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, 41 WAsH. L. REv. 1 (1966).
" Note, Trusts-The North Carolina Fiduciary Powers Act and the Duty of
Loyalty, 45 N.C.L. Rnv. 1141 (1967).
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Carolina General Assembly to achieve the dual objective of insuring that
trustees maintain a high standard of responsibility and at the same time
assist North Carolina taxpayers in contests with the government.
The General Assembly has demonstrated its awareness of the possible
tax consequences to the settlor who incorporates all of the powers in North
Carolina General Statutes section 32-27. But the admonition that "[n] o
power . . . shall be exercised by such fiduciary in such a manner as,
in the aggregate, to deprive the trust or the estate ... of [a] tax exemp-
tion, deduction or credit ... ,"' is probably totally ineffective as a tax
avoidance device because it not only provides no standard by which the
trustee may govern his conduct but also provides no standard by which
the courts may supervise a fiduciary's management of a trust.
Any statute that would limit the discretionary powers of a trustee to
compliance with usual or common law fiduciary principles or which would
impose active supervision of trusts by the courts is bound to negate part of
the freedom that many estate planners seek in setting up trusts with broad
management powers. Yet when one considers the need for continued
fiduciary responsibility and the added incentive of protection from tax
liability, the price may not be high at all.
MIKE CRUMP
Federal Jurisdiction-The Property Eights Exception to Civil Rights
Jurisdiction Under Section 1343(3)
Section 1343 of Title 28 of the United States Code vests the federal
district courts with
original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be
commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by
any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States .... 1
Section 1343(3), available regardless of the amount in controversy, is
important to potential litigants who desire a federal forum for the
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 32-26(b) (1966).
128 U.S.C. § 1343 (1964).
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